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SOME THOUGHTS ANENT MR. ALBERT R. HENRY'S
THESIS
THEODORE K. BRYANT
I, have examined with much interest the thesis of Mr. Henry on the
"Limitations Inherent in the Grant of Letters Patent," appearing in the Feb-
ruary issue of the CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY.' It is evident that Mr. Henry
has put much study and research into its preparation and he presents his point
of view with a great deal of force and acumen.
In the present discussion, I am making no attempt to meet the legal points
raised by the thesis. Of the many members of the patent legal profession,
it is probable that each has his individual ideas as to the course to pursue when
faced with the questions involved in a patent infringement suit. It may be
expected that the thesis will elicit various expressions as to the best course
to be followed in such cases, and will tend to enlighten the profession in this
respect. The thesis may thus provide some interesting arguments, since there
are many opinions present in the profession relative to the limitations to be
found and the course to be pursued when the patent grant is taken from its
resting place in the safe of the patentee and made a living, instrument through
the medium of a patent infringement suit. It is then that the clash in views
becomes manifest, with the point of view depending upon "whose ox is being
gored." The thesis may well serve a useful purpose in presenting some ideas
to both sides.
Personally, I am more concerned with the question of whether Mr. Henry's
proposal is constructive or destructive with respect to the patent system, and
what that system actually stands for. If the proposal will aid in developing
the beneficial results envisioned by the fathers of the system, it can be con-
sidered as constructive; but if, on the contrary, such proposal would tend to
reduce and cripple the intended benefits contemplated by the patent statutes,
it is clear that the proposal is destructive. The present discussion is designed
to consider, briefly, the, possibilities to be found in Mr. Henry's proposal in
these respects.
It is true, of course, that the patent statutes were and are designed to
further the development of the arts and sciences by giving to the meritorious
inventor a temporary monopoly on his particular contribution, with the proviso
that at the end of the period of the grant the contribution itself passes to the
public for free use. That is the theory underlying the patent statutes. Actually,
the patent grant confers authority to defend the monopoly in th6 courts
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against encroachment by others seeking to obtain some or all of the benefits
arising from the "brain-child" of the inventor. Unless such an encroachment
develops, the patent grant remains inactive with only a potential value, so far
as benefit to the inventor is concerned; but it does become active as a "printed
publication" from the date of grant, as expressive of the domaih which will
be opened to the public at the end of the monopoly term. The patent becomes
a "reference" against extension by later applicants, of the same monopoly
beyond the statutory period of the patent grant, and prevents invasion of the
particular domain of the grant by a succeeding inventor. The contract under-
lying the grant is thus made definite as to term and extent and the rights of
free use at the end of the monopoly period are preserved to the public.
Of course, the grant does not present an actual reward-only an opportu-
nity. Until the invention is put into actual practice the patent remains a mere
"printed publication." More is required of the inventor (6r of those oper-
ating under an assignment from the inventor) than simply securing the grant
of the patent, if the monopoly stage is to be reached. Creation of the invention
on paper is sufficient only to provide a potential monopoly; real monopoly
can be established only when the invention is put into actual practice, either
by those operating under the patent or by those appropriating it, or by both.
Because of these conditions only a small percentage of the granted patents
ever emerge from the "publication" status-of potential monopoly.
When the patent is developed commercially and the producer, inventor, or
assignee creates a market, the scope of the monopoly becomes important.
Competition results from a successful invention; the monopoly holder, of
course, seeks to retain his market against competition.
It is in this latter situation that the "war" begins. It is human nature for
the producer, who has taken all of the risks in developing a market for the
new product, to protect himself and his investment; it is also human nature
for others to try to reap some 'advantage from the development. Where the
competition is in the market itself, there is only commercial rivalry; but where
the competition reaches in the direction of the specific product, charges of
"poaching" and "pirating" inevitably arise. In both cases, the extent of the
monopoly granted to the producer comes into question.
Monopolies have been frowned upon, as evidenced by the Sherman and
Clayton acts; yet to by-pass the prohibitions of these acts, attempts are made
to utilize the "monopoly" of the patent grant as a basis upon which to main-
tain the monopolistic conditions. Where no attempt is made to carry the
monopoly beyond the clear intention of the valid patent claim, there is gen-
erally no invasion; but the general trend has been to reach beyond this limit,
and to try and expand the monopoly through interpretation of the claims.
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The "nose of wax" decision of the Supreme Court presents some of the ways
in which this has been attempted.
Attempts in this direction are not of modern origin; our modern contribu-
tion has been more the ingenuity of the profession in finding openings through
which to attain the end. From the beginning of the patent system, efforts have
been made to extend the area of the monopoly-to make a complete rather
than the limited monopoly set up by the statutes. Complete and absolute
monopoly is not possible because of the limited term of the grant; but efforts
have been made to eliminate the other limitations imposed by the statutes and
to make the monopoly complete for the term of the grant. Through the years
the efforts to do this have continued, and still continue.
Actually, the patent grant provides for a limited monopoly only. A com-
plete monopoly, even for a limited term, would tend to prevent fulfilment of
the purposes of the statutes, as it would foster a "dog in the manger" condi-
tion. Hence, there was imposed the limiting requirement that the extent of
the monopoly be defined in the claim. The description of the specification
could and would generally reach much further, but the actual domain of the
grant was found in the claim which the statutes required to be definite. It is
apparent that the purpose of the statutes was not only to provide this reward
for the meritorious inventor, but also to require that the public should be
given definite knowledge of the exact limits of the monopoly domain. Thus
it would be possible to know when one is inside or outside the granted
domain; others could then obtain grants, and the purposes of the statutes
would be carried out.
That only a limited monopoly was intended is evidenced both by decisions
of the courts and by acts of Congress. When a loop-hole was found which
promised to change these purposes materially, Congress took steps to close it,
not by changing the patent laws but by dealing with the monopoly phase of
the matter: the Sherman and Clayton acts evidence this intent. Further indi-
cations are the recent changes relative to public use and the shorter time in
which to reply to examiner's actions. These latter instances indicate an effort
to bring the grant to public notice as quickly as possible, so that the public
may know the limits of the monopoly domain. The grant is a reward to the
inventor, but it is given on condition that the public should not be harassed
by inability to ascertain the extent of the domain.
Many subterfuges have been employed to overcome these restrictions and
to obtain a complete monopoly status. The Carbice case,2 referred to by Mr.
2Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U. S. 27, 51 Sup. Ct.
334 (1931).
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Henry,3 is an instance in point. The product, dry-ice, could not be patented
as an article; and, since it was possible to produce it in different ways, a
process patent would not provide a complete monopoly. A patent was sought
and obtained for a refrigerating system employing dry-ice-a patent which
would be infringed by persons employing dry-ice as a refrigerant. The com-
pany then licensed users under the patent, one of the conditions of the license
being that only the dry-ice of the company could be used, thereby providing
a market for its unpatentable product. A competitor could produce the product
in other ways, but would have no market due to the conditions of the license.
The patent thus became a means of creating a monopoly on the dry-ice
product, due to the fact that a patent permits licensing. The company did
not deal commercially with the complete subject-matter of the claims-it dealt
only with dry-ice. Circumstances made it evident that the patent was being
used simply as a protective agency for marketing the unpatentable dry-ice.
The setting of the Motion Picture Pabtents case,4 differs from that of the
Carbice case, in that in the former the company produced a projection machine
and marketed it with the proviso that only films of certain selected parties
could be used. The machine was actually sold, completely changing ownership,
but control over its use was asserted through the lucrative contract limitation
as to what films could be used. In the A. B. Dick case,5 a course such as this
was permitted on the basis that the machine had been sold at practically cost
with the real return based on the profit on supplies. Since the ink and paper
which formed the supplies were standard and were needed for the best
operation of the machine, the decision can be considered reasonable. But in
the Motion Picture Patents case, the conditions differed for not only would
the picture machine operate with any projectible film, but successive films
necessarily differed as to subject. Ownership organization, by controlling both
machine and film production, attempted to exercise a monopolistic control.
The patent was used as the basis of this control.
The Barber case 6 was similar to the Carbice case, except that the patent
involved a process. The purpose was to market an emulsion, itself an un-
patentable product. The public could make the product, since it was not
patentable, but would be prevented from using it for curing. The court re-
fused to differentiate among machine, product, and process.
3(1942) 27 CORNELL L. Q. 214, 215 et passimn.4Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 502, 37 Sup. Ct.
416 (1917) ; (1942) 27 CORNELL L. Q. 214, 215 et passim.5Henry v. A. B. Dick, 224 U. S. 1, 32 Sup. Ct. 364 (1912) ; (1942) 27 CORNELL L. Q.
214, 220.6Leitch Mfg. Co v. Barber Co., 302 U. S. 458, 58 Sup. Ct. 288 (1938); (1942) 27
CORNELL L. Q. 214, 216 et passin.
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From the beginning, the complete claim of a patent has been the measure
of the grant domain. Only with a definite knowledge of the limits of the
grant domain can the public know when it is within or without such domain
and the completion of the contractual relationship between the grantee and
the public be made possible. Consider the chaotic conditions which would re-
sult from the use of other standards.
If we substitute the doctrine that the use of any element of a claim would
constitute infringement of that-claim, the difficulty is apparent; the more
elements in a claim the-greater would become the domain. In addition, the
grantee would have a monopoly on each of the aggregate elements of the
claim-a condition which would make monopolies of the individual elements
part of the grant domain. Such a course would quickly exhaust the elements
available and preclude further grants; on expiration of the term of the grant,
the rights set up by the grant would accrue to the public and end the activity
of the patent system itself.
If we substitute a description of the specification for the defining limits
of the claim, similar chaos would ensue. A description includes many matters
not included in the claim, and these would then be included in the grant
domain, whether patentable or not. In addition, it would not be possible for
the public to determine when it was within or without the domain.
The "use" to which Mr. Henry refers7 is not clear. If he refers to use on
the basis of conditions like those in the dry-ice case, it would be contrary to
the intent of the patent statutes and would tend to create an absolute monopoly
for a limited term. In addition, the public would be at a loss to determine
the area of the domain. Especially would this be true if only part of a "use"
claim could be infringed. Reference is made to these considerations because
Mr. Henry seems to advocate the substitution of "use" instead of "claim" as
the standard.
References by Mr. Henry to "process" may indicate that he employed the
term "use" in a different respect. I refer to the fact that under present
practice a patent claim generally is drawn along the lines of the product, as
found on the shelves of a dealer. Actually, the product is on the dealer's
shelves because of its potential period of use or service. If claims were
drawn in terms of the product in service, it would be more completely ex-
pressive of the actual invention. Many patents have issued with claims such
as this-claims which are founded on use or service characteristics rather
than on a simple catalog of parts. Such claims fall clearly within the accepted
purposes of the statutes, since they set forth definitely the limits of the
7(1942) 27 CoRNELL L. Q. at 218 et seq.
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monopoly domain in the claim itself. While this would seem to be defining
by use, it still leaves the complete claim as the standard. Since Mr. Henry
seems desirous of avoiding this latter approach, it is questionable whether he
refers to the "use" standard in that sense.
It would seem, therefore, that Mr. Henry is presenting a proposal approach-
ing the complete monopoly referred to above. He proposes to bring within
the protection of the grant articles that would not, under present practice,
come within such'protection. This seems to be implied by reference to the
fact that although the door has been closed by the courts to the article and
the machine, to the present time it has not been closed to the process. So he
proposes to utilize the process to open the door. If I am correct in this
assumption, the proposal is another in a long line of efforts designed to
circumvent the purposes of the patent statutes, while utilizing the statutes
as the basis for the action.
The proposal would contravene the purposes of the statutes for various
reasons, some of which are indicated above. Instead of providing a constant
incentive for improvement of the arts and sciences, it would tend toward
stagnation. The indefinite bounds of a grant and the inability to determine
what was within and without the domain of the grant would cause an improver
to ponder seriously the advisability of going forward and facing the risk of
a law suit for infringement.
The proposal would necessitate material changes in the patent practice.
There would need to be a change in point of view as to the purposes of the
statutes. Chaos would result from the attempt to establish a new standard
upon which to consider patents. Such chaos would reach from the Patent
Office through the courts to Congress itself. In other words, the time-honored
concept of a limited monopoly would be forced to give way to that of a com-
plete monopoly for a definite period.
A change in concept such as this would be revolutionary. While Mr. Henry
seems to propose a change through interpretation to exclude the process from
the inhibitions the courts have shown against the article and the machine, it
is apparent that any change should reach not only the process but, in equity,
the article and machine as well. This would require a complete change in the
fundamental concepts underlying patents, a change which would overturn
prior decisions regarding the article and the machine, and would give legality
to that which the courts have held illegal. When one envisions the scope and
extent of such a change, reaching into time-honored fundamentals, the results
are startling indeed.
The question arises: Who will be the beneficiary of the proposed change?
At present, the "publication" status of the grant remains until the grant is
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made active through a suit for infringement. The "publication" has a nuisance
value to subsequent inventors, and is a potential bar to would-be pirates and
infringers. ("Nuisance" is used to express the feelings of the later applicant
when confronted with the citation.) Nuisance value would remain unchanged
since it is the disclosure of the grant-and not its claims-which forms the
reference against later applicants.
Until the subject-matter of the grant reaches the commercial stage and
competition actually develops, the grant remains simply a "publication" with
a potential value. Infringement can arise only through making, using, or
selling that which is actually protected by the grant. While it may be present
where the subject-matter of the grant has not been exploited commercially,
most suits arise because of the development of competition in the commercial
field, indirectly by appropriation or directly by pirating.
Under such conditions the beneficiary of the proposed change would be the
one who had created the market, with the change serving to throw about him
a complete monopoly mantle. For others, chaos would result. Since it rarely
is true that the inventor has the means or ability to develop a market, the
plan would benefit those able to produce the market, rather than the one who
produced the invention. Patent statutes no longer would reward those en-
deavoring to improve the arts and sciences; instead they would reward busi-
ness acumen. Where infringement develops innocently, as where there is no
knowledge of the grant and there has been no commercial development of
the patent, the infringer generally ends the infringement as soon as he learns
of it. With the above-indicated chaotic conditions present in the interpreta-
tion of the monopoly domain, the innocent infringer would need to fight or
be mulcted.
The change in patent grant interpretation proposed by Mr. Henry would
seem to be destructive rather than constructive. It would substitute chaotic
conditions for the procedure which has been in force for many years and
under which the patent system has proved its value. The Congress and the
courts have tried constantly to prevent such conditions. I question the
advisability of making a change of this character-a change which, in the
end, would destroy the patent system itself.
Concededly, those who have assumed the risks of developing a market for
a new idea should receive a reward for their efforts. But this should not be
done at the expense of the patent system. In our trade mark and unfair
competition statutes, a successful producer can find protection for legitimate
rewards; rewards beyond the limited monopoly now permitted under the
patent statutes would be monopolistic and illegitimate.
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